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Abstract 
Frequent modifications to energy statistics have led to considerable uncertainty in China’s ability 
to achieve its carbon mitigation targets. Here, we quantitatively measure the impact of energy data 
revisions on China’s ability to achieve its mitigation targets. Our results indicate the following 
effects of data revisions: 1. Mitigation challenges have increased by 5%, and the achievement of 
national mitigation targets (as well as international pledges) might be postponed by two years. 2. 
Greater than expected carbon space or emission quota (from 22.94 to 31.31 Gt) will be obtained 
from 2015 to 2035. 3. CO2 peak levels may become highly uncertain, with the uncertainty varying 
from 12% to 29%. In addition to national mitigation targets, data revision has profound 
implications for key industrial sectors. For example, raw coal consumption by the cement and iron 
and steel industries has long been underestimated, bringing uncertainty to the achievement of 
industrial mitigation targets. Our results reveal considerable uncertainty in China’s energy data, 
and this uncertainty suggests that previous mitigation achievements have been overestimated and 
that the mitigation targets, carbon space values, and peak level estimates proposed by future 
mitigation schemes may not be reached. 
Keywords: Mitigation; China; Uncertainty; Data revision; CO2 inventory  
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1. Introduction 
China’s mitigation efforts have become increasingly important for meeting global decarbonisation 
targets because of China’s increasing share of global primary energy consumption and total 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Liu, 2015; Shan et al., 2015; van Ruijven et al., 2012). 
Ambitious mitigation policies have been proposed to reduce the carbon emissions from China’s 
carbon-intensive economy, and rigorous mitigation targets have been set to reduce carbon intensity 
(CO2 emissions per unit gross domestic product (GDP)) by 40-45% by 2020 and 60-65% by 2030 
compared with the 2005 level and to decrease peak carbon emissions by 2030 as promised in the 
2014 China-US joint agreement. These ambitious mitigation targets cannot be achieved without a 
solid national emission inventory that comprehensively describes China’s carbon status quo (Guan 
et al., 2012; Hong et al., 2016; Mi et al., 2017). Unfortunately, because of frequent revisions and 
inconsistent energy consumption data, China’s emission inventory has suffered from considerable 
uncertainty, and the reliability of this inventory has long been criticised (Korsbakken et al., 2016; 
Qi and Wu, 2013; Wang, 2011). These inconsistent underlying energy statistics can lead to over- 
or underestimations of national CO2 emissions and cause huge uncertainties in estimates of global 
emissions (Liu et al., 2015b; Marland et al., 2009), leading to errors in mitigation policies 
(Bruckner et al., 2014; Gregg et al., 2008; Guan et al., 2012).  
Due to the importance of this problem, the inconsistency of energy data has been widely debated 
(Guan et al., 2012; Ma et al., 2014; Qi et al., 2016). Most studies have focused on the reasons 
underlying the uncertainty in emission inventories (e.g., under-reporting of energy consumption 
by small firms and data inflation to fit GDP growth), discussed how to improve the quality of 
energy data (e.g., employing satellite technology or institutional reform) via different methods or 
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investigated means to verify the reliability of these data in comparison with international sources 
(Akimoto et al., 2006; Guan et al., 2012; Korsbakken et al., 2016; Li et al., 2016; Liu, 2015; 
Sinton, 2001). Causes related to institutional factors might be too difficult to resolve in the short 
term, which also implies that ongoing mitigation efforts will be accompanied by uncertainty in the 
near future. This challenge mainly arises because in a political assessment system that prioritises 
GDP growth, GDP data are likely to be inflated, while energy data are often manipulated to match 
the inflated GDP growth (Guan et al., 2011; Guan et al., 2012; Li et al., 2016). Moreover, the 
impacts of frequent data modifications on the mitigation targets are poorly understood. Here, we 
quantify the uncertainty in the estimates of CO2 emissions and the likelihood of achieving 
mitigation targets. We briefly illustrate the latest national energy data modification and compile 
CO2 emission inventories based on the revised and original data. Using our compiled emission 
inventory, we quantitatively measure the impacts of the 2015 revision on two national mitigation 
pledges (the 40-45% and 60-65% mitigation targets noted above). Finally, we analyse the effects 
of the revisions at the sectoral level and their implications for sectoral mitigation.  
 
2. Background: China’s energy data revision  
China has officially revised its energy statistics three times since 2000 (2006, 2010, and 2015) 
(Table 1). Such statistics modification is normally periodical in China, following the National 
Economic Census conducted every 5 years; the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) uses data from 
the economic census to validate the historical statistical data collected from the hierarchical 
statistical system and make adjustments. Each revision has modified the energy balance sheets 
and final energy consumption by industrial sectors (Guan et al., 2012; Liu, 2015). However, NBS 
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does not officially disclose the reasons for revising energy data or how the data were revised. The 
revisions might be due to the application of new statistical methods or the validation of historical 
data within economic census data. We assume that new statistical rules or methods would be 
carried over until the next revision. For example, the new statistical rules and methods applied in 
the 2010 revision would be applied to statistics from 2008 to 2012. We consider that data revised 
in a given revision belong to the dataset up to that revision. For example, the 2015 revision 
revised data from 2000 to 2012, including the 2010 data. Hence, the 2010 revision affected data 
within the range from 2000 to 2012. To avoid confusion and facilitate discussion, the data scope 
of the present research begins in 2000, and energy data provided in the 2015 revision are 
considered 2015 data (including data from 2000 to 2014); energy data provided in the 2010 
revision are considered 2010 data (including data from 2000 to 2012); data provided in the 2006 
revision are considered 2006 data (including data from 2000 to 2007); and data provided before 
the 2006 revision are considered original data (including data from 2000 to 2003).  
The data revision details are summarised in Table 1S.  
 
The first energy data revision was conducted in 2006. Based on the first National Economic 
Census in 2004, NBS revised energy data from 1999 to 2003 in 2006. Compared with the original 
data, the 2006 data increased total energy consumption by an average of 5% from 1999 to 2003. A 
major change was observed in raw coal and other petroleum products. In the 2006 data, the former 
increased by an average of 4%, and the latter increased by nearly 4-fold in comparison with the 
original data. The second energy revision followed the second National Economic Census in 2008, 
and energy data from 2000 to 2007 were massively revised by NBS in 2010. The new 2010 data 
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revised total energy consumption upward by an average of 7% from 2000 to 2007, from 3% in 
2007 to 10% in 2003 compared with the 2006 data. Compared with the 2006 data, the 2010 data 
mainly revised the historical consumption of raw coal and coke by average increases of 8% and 
3%, respectively. The third data revision was conducted in 2015 following the third National 
Economic Census in 2013. This revision modified the energy data from 2000 to 2012, with an 
average increase in the total energy consumption of 2%. The massive revision occurred especially 
after 2005, as the discrepancy in total energy consumption between the 2015 data and the 2010 
data increased constantly from a 4% gap in 2005 to an 11% gap in 2012. In the energy mix, the 
consumption of raw coal, other washing coal, coke and other gas in the 2015 data was 
substantially revised from 2000 to 2012, with average increases of 5.9% (1443 Mt), 9.4% (103 
Mt), 9.3% (359 Mt), and 129% (360 Mt), respectively, higher than the 2010 data. Notably, the 
energy data after 2007 were substantially revised in the 2015 data. According to the change rates 
for raw coal, other washing coal, and coke during the period from 2007 to 2012, the rates between 
the 2015 data and the 2010 data increased by 9.1%, 17.3%, 11.6%, respectively.  
Table 1. Comparison among the 2015 data, 2010 data, 2006 data and the original data  
Item Total Energy Consumption (Mtce) Raw Coal (Mt) 
Year 
2015 
data 
2010 
data 
2006 
data 
Original 
data 
2015 
data 
2010 
data 
2006 
data 
Original 
data 
2000 1,159 1,205 1,101 1,036 1,047 1,107 1,022 967 
2001 1,231 1,239 1,135 1,085 1,106 1,129 1,049 1,017 
2002 1,330 1,318 1,217 1,173 1,212 1,209 1,108 1,090 
2003 1,562 1,528 1,384 1,318 1,436 1,412 1,305 1,253 
2004 1,799 1,768 1,638   1,644 1,615 1,495   
2005 2,034 1,964 1,873   1,856 1,774 1,650   
2006 2,243 2,151 2,053   2,053 1,953 1,803   
2007 2,412 2,292 2,231   2,207 2,088 1,936   
2008 2,484 2,349 
 
  2,277 2,136 
 
  
2009 2,671 2,458 
 
  2,448 2,241 
 
  
2010 2,861 2,625 
 
  2,590 2,358 
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2011 3,141 2,845 
 
  2,886 2,605 
 
  
2012 3,258 2,939 
 
  2,978 2,669 
 
  
2013 3,388 
  
  3,092 
  
  
2014 3,319       2,928       
 
Note: Mtce=Million tons coal equivalent; Mt=Million tons. Underlined data indicate the 
revised data for each dataset. 
 
On the industrial level, the energy data revisions mainly revised energy consumption in 
energy-intensive industries related to raw coal consumption. The raw chemical and cement 
industries were the most affected. Comparing these industries in the 2015 revision with the 2010 
revision, the raw coal consumption in the 2015 revision increased by 41% (434 Mt) and 21.6% 
(425 Mt) for the raw chemical and cement industries, respectively, from 2000 to 2012, which 
accounted for 53% of the total raw coal consumption gap from 2000 to 2012 (Figure 1S). These 
shifts in energy consumption revealed by the data revision indicated a more carbonised China, 
which directly affects the emissions and thereby poses a threat to the global mitigation initiative. 
China has set its own mitigation targets as part of its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), 
which include two core pledges to reduce its carbon intensity by 40-45% by 2020 (2020 target) 
and by 60-65% by 2030 (2030 target). However, the mitigation schemes developed in 2009 and 
2014 are based on the 2010 data; therefore, large uncertainties in China’s mitigation policymaking 
and implementation might be generated from uncertain energy data, and these uncertainties further 
undermine China's ability to achieve its mitigation targets. To assess the impact of energy statistics 
revision on China’s mitigation pledge, we focus on the energy data from the 2010 and 2015 
revisions. Data from 2000 to 2014 in the two datasets are compared and analysed. 
 
3. Materials and Methods 
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3.1 Energy inventory compilation and data source 
All data were obtained from the China Energy Statistics Yearbooks for 2004 to 2015 (NBS, 
2004-2015). The China Energy Statistics Yearbooks represent the only official energy data source 
and are published annually by the NBS. These reports include the national “Energy Balance 
Sheets” and “Energy Consumption by Sectors Sheets”, which provide detailed final energy 
consumption data for the whole country and by sector (Guan et al., 2012). The energy balance 
sheets and the sectoral energy consumption are modified after the National Economic Census, and 
the newly revised energy data are reported in the subsequent yearbook. As this paper focuses on 
the impact of the statistics revision in the 2014 yearbook on China’s ability to achieve its 
mitigation pledges, we compare two groups of energy data: (1) 2010 data (2000 to 2012), which 
included energy data from 2000 to 2008 from the China Energy Statistics Yearbook 2009 and 
energy consumption data from 2000 to 2012 from the China Energy Statistics Yearbooks from 
2010 to 2013; and (2) 2015 data (2000 to 2014), which included revised energy data from 2000 to 
2013 from the China Energy Statistics Yearbook 2014 and energy consumption data for 2014 from 
the China Energy Statistics Yearbook 2015. We used two versions of the energy data to compile 
the energy inventory from 2000 to 2014. To ensure consistency and comparability between the 
2015 data (2000 to 2014) and 2010 data (2000 to 2012), we first extended the 2010 data to 2014 
by assuming the same growth rate for 2012 to 2013 and 2013 to 2014 in the 2010 data as that in 
the 2015 data. 
 
We adopted the sectoral energy consumption approach recommended by the IPCC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)to calculate the national territorial energy use, which 
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is different from the apparent energy consumption approach (Andres et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2015b; 
Shan et al., 2015). The latter approach is based on the mass balance of fuels for production, 
domestic and international trade, and stock change. Instead, the approach adopted here is based on 
energy production and trade data rather than on energy consumption (details can be found in Shan 
et al., 2015). The total energy consumption for each energy type is calculated using the following 
equation: total final consumption for each sector + energy used in processing and transforming 
(thermal power and heating supply) – losses – non-energy use. Following this approach, we 
prepared the national energy inventory for all the datasets. We collected all final energy 
consumption data (20 fuel types in total) for 47 socioeconomic sectors (42 of which are industrial 
sectors) from the China Energy Statistics Yearbooks. For the secondary energy type (thermal 
power and heating supply), the energy used in transforming was added to the corresponding 
sectors. For example, the total energy consumption for electricity generation is the final energy 
consumption in electricity generation (which is not used to generate electricity) plus the energy 
used in transforming from primary energy into electricity (transforming coal to electricity). After 
the losses and non-energy use are removed, the energy inventory can be presented for each energy 
type used in each socioeconomic sector. A detailed layout of the energy inventory is shown in 
Supplementary 2. We prepared energy inventories for the original, 2006, 2010 and 2015 datasets, 
which provide activity data for the subsequent CO2 inventory. 
 
3.2 CO2 emission inventory  
China publishes carbon per GDP intensity target achievements that can be used with GDP data to 
estimate "official" CO2 emissions. In this study, the CO2 inventories are based on the energy 
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inventories compiled above, which followed the IPCC national GHG inventory guidelines (IPCC, 
2006; Peters et al., 2007; Shan et al., 2016). The emissions were calculated using the activity data 
(the amount of fossil fuels (physical units)) multiplied by the respective emission factor (EF) 
(Equation (1)): 
CE = ∑ ∑ 𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗 × 𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑗                              (1) 
where CE  represents the total aggregated CO2 emissions from different energy types i used by 
sector j. AD𝑖𝑗 (amount of fossil fuels i used in sector j) represents the fossil fuels combusted, 
measured in physical units, and EFij represents the emission factors for the fossil fuels i used in 
sector j. EFs can be separated into three parts: the net heating value of each fuel i (TJ per t fuel), 
which refers to the quantity of heat obtained per unit of fuel; the carbon content c of each fuel i (tC 
per TJ), which indicates the amount of carbon that could be released per heat unit during 
combustion; and the oxidisation rate o (%), which indicates the fraction of fuel i oxidised by each 
sector during combustion. The sub-factors are specific for the fuel type and sectors (Equation (2)): 
CE = ∑ ∑ 𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗 × 𝑛𝑖 × 𝑐𝑖 × 𝑜𝑖𝑗                      (2) 
By aggregating the CO2 emissions from different fossil fuels and sectors, we obtained the total 
CO2 emissions. Although the default value was provided by the IPCC, different EFs were used 
because local fuel practices contribute to the uncertainty in CO2 emissions (IPCC). In this paper, 
we refer to the EFs used in Liu’s research (Liu et al., 2015b), in which the default EFs used by the 
IPCC were updated via surveys of coal mines. The results showed that Chinese emissions were 
overestimated by international institutes (such as IEA, EDGAR) by up to 14% in 2013. Following 
this approach, CO2 emission inventories for each sector and each energy type were compiled; a 
layout is shown in Supplementary 2. All data can be accessed via China Emission Accounts and 
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Datasets (www.ceads.net), a free China energy data sharing platform. The CO2 emissions for 
different datasets are shown in Figure 2. Based on the CO2 emission inventory for each dataset 
constructed above, the historical carbon intensity can be calculated by CO2 emissions/GDP. 
Historical GDP data were collected from the China Statistics Yearbooks from 2001 to 2015.  
 
3.3 CO2 emission projection  
The Kaya identity is based on the famous IPAT equation 
(Impact=Population×Affluence×Technology) used to develop identical equations for 
anthropogenically driven forces (Equation 3) (Kaya, 1990), and the Kaya identity is used to 
project future GHG emissions in many international projection systems, including the IPCC:  
      Total emissions = 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × (
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
) × (
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
𝐺𝐷𝑃
) × (
𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
)          (3) 
The projection equation can be further simplified because of the strong correlation between GDP 
and CO2 emissions (Blanco et al., 2014) as well as the essentially consistent population size in 
short-term projections. Changes in CO2 emissions can be driven by increases in economic 
activities (reflected by the GDP) and changes in the carbon intensity of the economy. Thus, 
emissions can be decomposed into a simplified Kaya identity (see Equation 4). This method is 
simple but effective and has been used by Friedlingstein et al. (Friedlingstein et al., 2014). In this 
paper, we follow the same projection method:  
         Total emissions = 𝐺𝐷𝑃 × 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑦                 (4) 
Therefore, two parts must be projected: the GDP and the carbon intensity. 
The first part is GDP projection. Future GDP data (constant price at 2000 levels) were 
extrapolated based on the growth rate from China’s 13th Five Year Plan (2016 to 2020), which 
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averaged 6.5% during the period (NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission), 
2015). This growth rate is nearly in accordance with the GDP forecast by the World Bank (shown 
in Supplementary 2). We assumed that average GDP growth rate was 6% for 2021 to 2025, 5.5% 
for 2026 to 2030, and 5% for 2031 to 2035. This assumption is based on the trend in China’s 
planned GDP growth rates; these rates were set as 7.5% for the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), 7% 
for the 12th Five Year Plan (2011 to 2015), and 6.5% for the 13th Five Year Plan (2016 to 2020). 
Additional details are shown in Table 2 and Supplementary 2.  
The second part is the carbon intensity. We assumed that China would maintain the mitigation 
policy implemented in its 12th Five Year Plan (2011 to 2015), with an average rate of decline of 
3.2% annually in the future. We treat this trend as the typical scenario to evaluate the impact of the 
data revision in 2015 on achieving the 2020 and 2030 mitigation pledges. We made this 
assumption because the carbon intensity trajectory is largely affected by mitigation policies 
developed for the different five-year plans. In the 12th Five Year Plan, mitigation is a key national 
policy and is implemented in multi-level development plans. We employed a trend analysis 
(exponential regression) based on historical carbon intensity (2011 to 2014) to project the future 
trend and evaluate whether China can achieve its mitigation pledges under the mitigation policy of 
the 12th Five Year Plan.  
 
To determine the uncertainty of China’s carbon emission peak level, two other scenarios were 
introduced to compare with the basic scenario. (1) The accelerated scenario assumes that 
mitigation would be reinforced in the future; the carbon intensity is projected using the same 
method as in the 12th Five Year Plan scenario but is based on data obtained for the most recent 5 
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years. For example, to project carbon intensity in 2019, the carbon intensity from 2014 to 2018 
was used. (2) The alternative scenario is derived from Green and Stern’s research, which projects 
the peak emission time based on updated Chinese socioeconomic data. Their CO2 projection 
assumes (Green and Stern, 2016) that the GDP growth rate from 2015 to 2020 will average 6.5% 
annually and will decrease to 5.5% from 2020 to 2025 (the rate is assumed to remain the same 
until 2035). From 2015 to 2020, the energy intensity decreases at a fixed annual rate of 4%, and 
the CO2 intensity of energy decreases at a fixed rate of 1% and then increases to 1.5% thereafter. 
Compared with the other two scenarios, Green and Stern’s scenario can be considered the strictest 
mitigation scenario, as the carbon intensity decline rate in this scenario is much higher than those 
in the others (e.g., 5.44% for 2020-2035 in Green and Stern’s scenario and 4.59% in the 12th Five 
Year Plan scenario). We compared the CO2 peak levels of different datasets in three scenarios to 
present how the data revision affects peak level changes. The details can be found in 
Supplementary 2. 
 
In a sectoral mitigation analysis, we derived the sectoral CO2 emissions (from 2005 to 2014) from 
the previously constructed CO2 emission inventory of the 2015 data and 2010 data and collected 
sectoral GDP data from the China Statistics Yearbooks (2006-2015). Based on the sectoral CO2 
and GDP, the historical carbon intensity from 2005 to 2014 can be calculated before we project the 
sectoral carbon intensity using the trend analysis (in Supplementary 2). Notably, the sectoral 
carbon intensity for key sectors is projected from 2005 to 2020 only because mitigation policy was 
first included in sectoral economic plans in 2005; this intensity may present wide variations and 
might be difficult to precisely estimate over longer periods. Using the sectoral projection, we 
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evaluated the impacts of data revisions on achieving sectoral mitigation targets. 
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Table 2. Summary of Scenarios and Assumptions 
Scenarios Indicators 2016-2020 2021-2025 2026-2030 2031-2035 Description 
12th Five 
Year Plan 
Scenario 
Average GDP Growth 6.50% 6% 5.50% 5% 
GDP assumption derived from the 13th 
Five Year Plan (6.5% for 2016-2020) and 
extrapolated to 2035 by subtracting 0.5% 
every 5 years. The carbon intensity is 
projected using an exponential 
regression based on intensity 
(2011-2015) for the 12th Five Year Plan 
scenario and on the last 5 years for the 
accelerated scenario. 
Carbon 
Intensity 
2015 Data -4.59% -4.59% -4.59% -4.59% 
2010 Data -4.82% -4.82% -4.82% -4.82% 
Accelerated 
Scenario 
Average GDP Growth 6.50% 6% 5.50% 5% 
Carbon 
Intensity 
2015 Data -5.11% -4.99% -4.99% -5.00% 
2010 Data -5.29% -5.19% -5.19% -5.20% 
Green& 
Stern 
Scenario 
Average GDP Growth 6.50% 5.5% 5.5% 5.5% GDP and carbon intensity assumptions 
are derived from Green & Stern's 
research. 
Carbon 
Intensity 
2015 Data -4.96% -5.44% -5.44% -5.44% 
2010 Data -4.96% -5.44% -5.44% -5.44% 
Note: The carbon intensity decline rate is an annual rate of decrease, and the GDP growth is the average rate for the respective period. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Challenges in reaching mitigation targets caused by data revisions 
Uncertain energy data imply uncertainty in achieving mitigation targets. First, we update the 
carbon intensity based on different energy statistics from 2000 to 2014 and extend the trajectory to 
2035. As shown in Figure 1, because of the data revision, the mitigation benchmark (carbon 
intensity of 2005) increased by 5%. Accordingly, the mitigation target required to reach the 2020 
target increased from 19.47 to 20.49 Mt/103 Yuan (CNY), and the target required to reach the 2030 
target increased from 12.82 to 13.51 Mt/103 CNY (the blue and red dashed lines in Figure 1 refer 
to the 40% and 60% reductions, respectively). Therefore, the overall mitigation requirements were 
increased (the black line and brackets in the figure refer to the required carbon intensity before and 
after revision, respectively). The uncertainty introduced by the revised energy statistics raises 
doubts about China's ability to achieve its mitigation pledges for 2020 and 2030. For example, the 
revisions suggest that the originally reported mitigation achievements might be inflated. Based on 
an extrapolation of the 2010 data, China had achieved a 29.9% carbon intensity reduction by 2014 
(22.45 Mt/103 CNY) compared with the 2005 level; however, under the revision, this figure 
changes to a 25.23% reduction (25.24 Mt/103 CNY).  
 
Under the assumption that the recent trends will continue, we extended the trend-based carbon 
intensity to 2035 (see Methods) (Figure 1) and projected that China can achieve the 40% carbon 
intensity reduction target (2020 target) by 2018, which represents a 41% carbon intensity 
reduction based on the 2010 data; however, the latest national data revision indicates that this 
target will not be met until 2020. This change may be attributed to the lower reduction rate of 
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carbon intensity indicated by the 2015 data. The 2010 data showed that the average Chinese 
carbon intensity from 2000 to 2014 decreased at a rate of 2.2% per year, whereas after the revision, 
the rate of reduction was 1.2%. Compared with the 2010 data for the same year, the lower 
reduction rate of the 2015 data leads to a higher carbon intensity, which causes the delay in 
meeting the mitigation targets. For the 2030 target, the 2010 statistics indicate that carbon 
intensity could be reduced by 60.7% by the end of 2026, whereas the revision indicates a delay in 
achieving the mitigation targets until 2028. A comparison between the 2015 data and 2010 data 
indicates that the 2015 data are associated with higher mitigation requirements (13.51 Mt/103 
CNY for the 2020 target and 20.26 for the 2030 target, 5% higher than the requirement for the 
2010 data) but a lower mitigation rate (1.2% for the 2015 data; 2.2% for the 2010 data), 
contributing to the uncertainty in the mitigation targets and CO2 trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 1. China carbon intensity trajectory (projection for 2015 to 2035). Triangles and circles 
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indicate historical data and projection data, respectively. Red and blue indicate the 2015 and 2010 
data, respectively. The red and blue lines crossing the triangles indicate a mitigation benchmark 
(2005 carbon intensity level). The red dashed line indicates the mitigation target for the 2015 data, 
and the blue dashed line indicates the mitigation target for the 2010 data. The green dots represent 
when the 2020 mitigation target is achieved, and the yellow dots represent when the 2030 
mitigation target is achieved. The black line and brackets indicate the changes in mitigation 
requirements. The black arrows are for the 2020 mitigation target, and the parentheses show the 
2030 mitigation target. The unit of the Y-axis is Mt/103 CNY. Note: CNY here is Chinese Yuan. 
 
4.2 Carbon space and peak level changes  
The revision of increased CO2 emissions directly changed past CO2 emissions in terms of the 
numbers and massively changed the trend slope of past emissions, which largely determined the 
future CO2 trajectory and the achievement of mitigation targets. As the key feature of the NDCs, 
the CO2 emission peak level has received widespread attention since late 2014, when the pledge 
was made. Using the simplest Kaya equation, we extended the CO2 emission trajectory illustrated 
by the two datasets to 2035 to reveal how the data revision affects the peak levels. Although many 
factors may contribute to the CO2 emission peak, mitigation policies play an important role in the 
peak levels. Because of the uncertain policy background, modellers employ scenario analyses to 
track China’s CO2 trajectory via assumptions for different portfolios of policies (Liu et al., 2015a; 
Mi et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016); however, the uncertainty in the energy data leads to additional 
uncertainty in the scenario analyses. To illustrate this uncertainty, we created an accelerated 
scenario (see Methods) and used Green and Stern’s projection assumption (Green and Stern, 2016) 
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(see Methods) for CO2 emissions for comparative purposes and to evaluate the impacts of 
uncertain data. We found that the peak level changes dramatically and ranges from 12.38% to 
17.85% of peak level by 2010 data for different scenarios due to data revision. Following the CO2 
emission trend based on the 12th Five Year Plan (12th FYP), the CO2 emissions should peak at 9.89 
Gt in 2032; however, the 2015 data increase the peak level by 17.85% to 11.65 Gt in 2034 (Figure 
2). In the accelerated scenario, the 2015 data indicate that China would reach the peak of 10.76 Gt 
CO2 in 2030, whereas the 2010 data suggest that this figure will be 9.21 Gt CO2 in 2028 (Figure 2). 
However, according to Green and Stern’s method, the peak level would be 10.13 Gt and 9.08 Gt 
CO2 for the 2015 and 2010 data, respectively, a difference of 12.38%. When considering only the 
uncertainty from the scenarios (without regarding data revision), the uncertainty would be 15% for 
the 2015 data and 9% for the 2010 data. To save the space and avoid confusion, we transit three 
scenarios of 12th Five Year Plan, accelerated scenario and Green and Stern’s scenarios in to 
Scenarios 1, 2, 3 in the Figure 2 respectively. However, the uncertainty in the CO2 peak might 
increase to 29%. Notably, the data revision significantly changes the past trend, especially in the 
2011-2015 data series, which greatly affects the CO2 trajectory. Although the 2015 data revision 
increased the CO2 emissions compared with the 2010 data, this revision also indicates a slower 
carbon intensity reduction rate than the 2010 data, implying less CO2 growth in the future. 
Therefore, the influence of data revision on the CO2 trajectory is not only a numeric change, in 
which the 2015 data revised CO2 emissions upward, but also changes the annual carbon intensity 
reduction rate during 2011-2015 from -4.82% to -4.59%. This difference affects the future CO2 
trajectory, especially for scenarios 1 and 2. Other studies have presented estimates of the peak 
level. Zhang et al. (2016) applied a C-GEM model, the multiregional simulation model for global 
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energy and economic systems, which is capable to capture the impact of policy by finding its 
effects on prices and goods, further people behaviours and then domestic economic activities. The 
research found that China’s emissions would peak at 10 to 12 Gt CO2 based on different scenarios. 
Mi et al. (2016) adopted the input-output model to project a peak level of 11.20 to 12.59 Gt based 
on different constraints. Liu et al. (2015a) used the Kaya identity model and estimated that the 
peak level might be 10.7 to 11.9 Gt in different scenarios.  
 
The changes in the CO2 trajectory generate additional under-reported CO2 emissions, which means 
that China would gain additional carbon space (or emissions quota for mitigation targets) because 
of the data revision. After the 2015 revision, the gap between the CO2 emissions calculated from 
the two energy datasets increased from 67 Mt to 1045 Mt every year from 2000 to 2014. During 
this period, CO2 emissions cumulatively increased by 7.4 Gt, which accounted for 7.8% of the 
total emissions based on the new data compared with the cumulative emissions from the 
pre-revised data. This change suggests that the 7.4 Gt CO2 was under-reported before the data 
update in 2015. In the future, the carbon space will likely present increased uncertainty because of 
the data revision. The results of all the scenarios indicate significant differences in the carbon 
space, which ranges from 22.94 to 31.31 Gt from 2015 to 2035 (36% uncertainty). Moreover, the 
uncertainty related to the additional emission space implies that the global carbon budget before 
the revision was underestimated; thus, the global CO2 quota to reach the 2°C mitigation target is 
reduced (Friedlingstein et al., 2014). 
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Figure 2 China’s emission trajectory and projections (Unit: Gt CO2).  
Figure 2 compares the differences in peak level reached in the two datasets under the three 
scenarios. The peak levels reached by the 2015 data are 12.38% (1114 Mt), 17.3% (1487 Mt), and 
17.85%(1764 Mt) higher than the peak levels projected by the 2010 data for the three scenarios, 
respectively. Scenario 1 is the 12th Five Year Plan scenario; Scenario 2 is the accelerated scenario; 
Scenario 3 is the Green and Stern scenario. In the 2010 data, the 2013 and 2014 emission data 
were extrapolated using the change rate of these two years in the 2015 data. Details can be found 
in the Methods section.  
22 
 
 
4.3 Implications for industrial mitigation 
Because China’s mitigation initiatives are disaggregated into energy-intensive sectors, the revised 
CO2 emissions in the national inventory have resulted in uncertainty at the sectoral level. Together, 
three key industrial sectors consume more than 70% of the total energy: electricity supply 
(approximately 40%), non-metal mineral product manufacturing (14%), and ferrous metal 
smelting and pressing (20%). These sectors have the highest emissions and lowest emission 
efficiencies (high emissions/low output) (Chen and He, 2016; Liu et al., 2012; Wang and Liang, 
2013). Mitigation policies for these sectors are highly important and directly determine the 
mitigation results; therefore, we focus on how the data revision affects these sectors. Because of 
the importance of these sectors to mitigation accounts, these sectors are required to publish 
sectoral action plans for reducing their emissions and CO2 intensity (Wang et al., 2014). As 
indicated by the newly released 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020), non-metal mineral product 
manufacturing aims to decrease its carbon intensity by 15% by 2020 and ferrous metal smelting 
and pressing aims to decrease its carbon intensity by 10% by 2020. Notably, carbon intensity for 
sector is the sectorial carbon emissions per unit sectorial GDP.  
However, the 2015 data revision has a much greater effect on the steel and iron and cement 
industries than on the other sectors, which suggests that the historical energy consumption data for 
these two key sectors might be problematic. Because of the unique role of these sectors in the 
mitigation, any uncertainty in their energy data is important. The revision of energy data from 
2000 to 2014 increased emissions from the iron and steel industry by an average of 17% (range 
from 5% to 31%), which was mainly induced by the energy required for steel production. The 
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emissions from cement production increased by 5% (range from -12% to 15%). During 2005 to 
2012, the revised emissions increased by 12% each year (Table 2S). If we assume that the latest 
2015 data are reliable, these findings would indicate a 21% underestimate for the steel industry 
and a 12% underestimate for the cement industry from 2005 to 2012 (Table 2S). The mitigation 
achievements of the iron and steel industry from 2005 to 2012 decreased from 45% to 35% 
because of the lower mitigation rate in the 2015 data, and the cement industry showed a slight 
decrease from 60% to 58%. The data revision in 2015 might make it more challenging to achieve 
mitigation targets. Based on the trend analysis, we extended the emissions to 2020 for the carbon 
intensity calculation. We found that the projected carbon intensity reduction from the iron and 
steel industry over the period of 13th Five Year Plan would decline significantly from 12% to 8%, 
while the carbon intensity reduction of the cement industry decreased from 34% to 28%. Based on 
the trends observed in the latest data, the sectoral mitigation target for the iron and steel industry 
might not be achieved. 
Raw coal plays a dominant role in the energy structures of these two energy-intensive sectors. 
However, revision in raw coal consumption and its related emissions are not same for the two 
sectors. For the cement industry, raw coal-related emissions from 2000 to 2012 increased by an 
average of 14% after the revision, especially after 2005, since emissions were increased by an 
average of almost 30%. Subsequently, the total sectoral emission increased by an average of 5% 
from 2000 to 2012 and 12% after 2005 (details in Table 2S). The revision in raw coal consumed in 
the cement industry might indicate an underestimate of raw coal usage before 2015. However, 
there was an anomaly for the iron and steel industry between raw coal-related emissions and the 
sectoral emissions. From 2000 to 2008, coal-related emissions under the 2015 data were 10% 
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lower than those in the 2010 data, whereas the total sectoral emissions in the 2015 data were 15% 
higher than those in the 2010 data. After 2008, the changes in the coal-related emissions in the 
2015 data were in accordance with those of the sectoral emissions but only accounted for 5% of 
the sectoral emission changes (Table 3S). As the dominant energy type in the iron and steel 
industry, the trend in coal-related emissions should have matched that of total emissions. The 
opposite change may have profound implications. For the steel industry, we found that the 
emissions from raw coal decreased while the emissions from coke and other gas increased after 
the revision, especially for other gas, which showed a three-fold growth (Table 2S). This finding 
may imply that a proportion of the coke and other gas used in the steel industry might have been 
categorised as raw coal in previous statistics, which would have overestimated the previous 
reliance of the steel industry on raw coal before 2008 and underestimated the raw coal 
consumption since 2008.  
 
5. Conclusion and policy recommendations 
CO2 emissions are the main target of global emission mitigation, and the sheer magnitude of CO2 
emissions increases the importance of obtaining correct data because the uncertainties are closely 
correlated with the ability to achieve mitigation targets (Monni et al., 2004). This paper compares 
the difference in the 2015 energy data revision in China and shows how the large uncertainty 
impacts the achievement of national mitigation targets that are essential in global decarbonisation 
initiatives. After the energy statistics revisions, mitigation challenges increase by 5%, and 
achieving national mitigation targets (and international pledges) might be postponed by two years, 
from 2018 to 2020, to reach the 40% carbon intensity reduction target and from 2026 to 2028 to 
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reach the 60% carbon intensity reduction target. This delay is due to the slower carbon intensity 
reduction rate in the 2015 data. The 2015 data revision increased the past CO2 emissions; therefore, 
extra carbon space (from 22.94 to 31.31 Gt) might be generated from 2015 to 2035, and CO2 peak 
levels with the uncertainty varying from 12% to 29% might be induced by the revised energy 
statistics. In addition to the national mitigation targets, mitigation targets for key industrial sectors 
are affected by the data revision, in which raw coal consumption for the cement and iron and steel 
industries increased greatly. Although our study shows that achieving mitigation targets would not 
be derailed by the data revisions, the unexpected carbon space and lower carbon intensity 
reduction rate suggest that the mitigation challenges will exceed current estimates, especially for 
key mitigation sectors for which the data revision has altered sectoral mitigation prospects. 
Furthermore, the revisions have additional implications for global decarbonisation initiatives 
because the tremendous carbon space reported by the new data has long been underestimated. The 
remaining emission quota from 2015 with the 2°C goal (66% probability) is 1200 Gt CO2. With 
the new data, extra carbon space in China might compromise the total remaining emission quota, 
increasing the challenges for other countries with shrinking emission quotas. This paper clearly 
shows that the uncertainties in the past will be reflected in uncertainties in projections of the 
future. 
The revised data show inconsistencies in the energy data; however, they also show the progress in 
the energy statistics system, as the gap between the updated national data and aggregated 
provincial data is decreasing (Guan et al., 2012; Shan et al., 2015). It appears plausible that the 
energy accounting system will improve as the gap is reduced, but the current institutional 
arrangement of a bottom-up energy accounting system still relies on energy accounting at a lower 
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level, such as the city level, which requires highly accurate and reliable primary energy 
consumption data from manufacturers. Collecting these fundamental data is confronted with huge 
challenges such as local governments manipulating data for political benefits or a lack of control 
over small coal mines or factories, as described in previous research (Guan et al., 2012; Li et al., 
2014; Zheng et al., 2014). In the current energy accounting institutions, more on-site surveys on 
energy data collection and accuracy checks with qualified labour would be helpful but costly. With 
the importance of China’s energy statistics in the world, a well-established energy accounting 
system is urgently required to ensure consistency and accuracy instead of relying on National 
Economic Census data every 5 years to make adjustments. Alternative energy accounting 
approaches such as remote-sensing technology could be considered to monitor and verify CO2 
emissions.   
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Table Caption 
Table 1 Comparison between 2015 data, 2010 data, 2006 data and Original data 
Note: Mtce=Million tons coal equivalent; Mt=Million tons. Underlined data indicate the 
revised data for each dataset. 
 
Table 2 Summary of Scenarios and Assumptions  
Note: The carbon intensity decline rate is an annual rate of decrease, and the GDP growth is the 
average rate for the respective period. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. China carbon intensity trajectory (projection for 2015 to 2035). Triangles and circles 
indicate historical data and projection data, respectively. Red and blue indicate the 2015 and 2010 
data, respectively. The red and blue lines crossing the triangles indicate a mitigation benchmark 
(2005 carbon intensity level). The red dashed line indicates the mitigation target for the 2015 data, 
and the blue dashed line indicates the mitigation target for the 2010 data. The green dots represent 
when the 2020 mitigation target is achieved, and the yellow dots represent when the 2030 
mitigation target is achieved. The black line and brackets indicate the changes in mitigation 
requirements. The black arrows are for the 2020 mitigation target, and the parentheses show the 
2030 mitigation target. The unit of the Y-axis is Mt/103 CNY. Note: CNY here is Chinese Yuan. 
 
Figure 2 China’s emission trajectory and projections (Unit: Gt CO2).  
Figure 2 compares the differences in peak level reached in the two datasets under the three 
scenarios. The peak levels reached by the 2015 data are 12.38% (1114 Mt), 17.3% (1487 Mt), and 
17.85%(1764 Mt) higher than the peak levels projected by the 2010 data for the three scenarios, 
respectively. Scenario 1 is the 12th Five Year Plan scenario; Scenario 2 is the accelerated scenario; 
Scenario 3 is the Green and Stern scenario. In the 2010 data, the 2013 and 2014 emission data 
were extrapolated using the change rate of these two years in the 2015 data. Details can be found 
in the Methods section.  
 
